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Key Analysis 10 Aug 2001

The following stats are being pulled from a keyring that was exported from pgp.dtype.org on August 9, 2001. Before reading this, please be sure to view the explanation of this analysis and read the FAQ before asking me any questions about it.

The strong set MSD raw analysis is available here. Please read the FAQ to explain how to read this file. This file includes all keys reachable from the strong set. Look up reports for individual keys in the raw output directory. Now you can see what keys are signed by each key (otherwise very difficult to find).

New This Month

Thanks to Randy Harmon at NAI (pgp.com) for a full dump, and a significant increase in the keyring size. Much of the growth of the keyring came from merging this ring. As always, continued thanks to Peter Wan for his efforts in maintaining global rings.

The individual key analysis now also includes hop count histograms to each key from the strong set.

Special Report - Other Strongly Connected Sets

As mentioned in the explanation, I have chosen to focus on what is by far the largest strongly connected set, which I call the "strong set". There are, however, other smaller sets which are strongly connected. This means that groups of friends are reachable from each other, but have not exchanged signatures with anyone in the larger "strong set".

This month, I've made a scan for _all_ strongly connected sets, from the largest, at size 10,153, to the n-way tie for last place with strongly connected sets of 1.

Set size Number of sets
10,1531
981
591
342
331
311
291
286
271
261
232
211
202
195
181
175
1610
1516
1420
1319
1222
1125
1049
982
892
7136
6244
5425
4835
31,741
25,094
135,353

As you can see, the largest strongly connected set is orders of magnitude larger than the next biggest (10,153 compared to 98), which at least somewhat validates the decision to focus on this set. Other relatively large strongly connected sets could easily merge with the larger one by simply having _any_ of the set's members exchange signatures with someone in the larger set.

Again, just because there is a path between two keys does not mean that there should be any implied trust. The reason this matters to this report is the math behind these numbers relies somewhat on strongly connected sets.

General statistics
Size of binary keyring (bytes): 1,853,471,920(+7.52%)
Number of keys: 1,577,742(+7.13%)
Non-revoked keys with at least one non-self sig: 147,701(+5.82%)
Total non-self sigs on those keys: 302,662(+5.72%)

The "strong set"
Size of largest strongly connected set: 10,153(+6.18%)
Keys that have signed this set: 14,811(+6.04%)
Keys that this set has signed (target of MSD calculations): 40,249(+5.27%)

Best connected keys (shortest distance to)

Please read about the mean shortest distance (MSD) calculated here in the analysis explanation. Here are the top 50 keys. Look for your own key in this month's raw analysis (see above). Note that the only keys analyzed were those reachable from the strong set. I've included some of my own comments on people I recognize. I'm sorry if you're listed here without a comment. If you email me a quick phrase to describe what you do that would be of interest to readers, I'll put it in.

The average MSD is 6.6224, in the set of 10,153. The median value is 6.1993.

Go to this keyserver's web interface to look up these keys.

RankHex ID (last 32b) Key Name (Identifier)Comments MSD
109590CFDPeter N. WanGA Tech college of computing4.0775
24F570BA3Ingmar CamphausenPGP security maverick4.0855
3466B4289Theodore Ts'o [SIGNATURE]ext2fstools, Kerberos, LSB, other4.1057
4F95C2F6DChristoph MartinDebian maintainer & uni-mainz keyserver admin4.1537
58B4608A1Peter N. Wan PNW2048GA Tech college of computing4.2050
6F081195DMatthias Bauer4.2149
709AC0A6AL. Sassamancypherpunks4.2308
80A2F87E5Niels Provos (#2)OpenBSD, OpenSSH, IPSEC4.2601
9C2009841Niels ProvosOpenBSD, OpenSSH, IPSEC4.2674
100679ED91teun.nijssen@kub.nl Manages SURFnet servers, scanned PGP source code4.2884
11C7A966DDPhilip R. ZimmermannInventor of PGP4.3007
120DBF906DJeffrey I. SchillerMIT Security/Network Manager4.3037
135B0358A2Werner KochAuthor of GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)4.3064
141CF27FD5Marc HorowitzAuthor of pks PGP keyserver software4.3186
158531327FMartin Spill4.3376
1608C95A15SURFnet-Master-Certification-Key 4.3458
17DD934139Patrick Feisthammelhosts Swiss PGP keyserver, www.ch.pgp.net4.3498
1866A74B31Teun NijssenManages SURFnet servers, scanned PGP source code4.3632
19DC4ED62DIngmar Camphausen, DFN-PCAPGP security maverick4.3692
2052D1CAB1Nathalie WeilerSecurity researcher at ETH Zurich4.3728
2180B07A4FTheodore Ts'oext2fstools, Kerberos, LSB, other4.3859
22FAEBD5FCPhilip R. ZimmermannInventor of PGP4.4020
2313D9873DMirko Dziadzka4.4043
24DA0EDC81Phil Karn4.4076
25A094DA25Patrick Feisthammel CERTIFICATION ONLY, Key A 4.4171
2628C029AFDave Del Torto4.4301
2746F3212DLaMont JonesDebian developer, postfix junkie4.4304
282B48F6F5Ian GoldbergISAAC, Crypto guru4.4412
2900292B81Nathalie WeilerSecurity researcher at ETH Zurich4.4432
30E39AF3E9Chelo Malagon4.4462
312DE30EC1CERT Coordination CenterCERT4.4498
3209D3E64DGreg RoseUSENIX, PGPMoose4.4550
3375BE8097Florian Lohoff4.4613
34FE0B386DPasztor, Miklos4.4633
35603F2D01Stefan Kelm4.4648
36C158CCEDFlorian Lohoff4.4685
377362BE39Carl EllisonChief cryptographer, Intel4.4697
38C3FC4C69Steven M. BellovinSecurity expert, AT&T Labs4.4740
39BB1D9F6Dct magazine CERTIFICATE4.4751
406916C873Peter N. Wan PNWGTDH4096GA Tech College of Computing4.4762
418B05342DGraham King4.4802
421FE961A1Harald Koenig4.4814
43ED9547EDWichert AkkermanDebian Project Leader emeritus4.4856
444413B691Thomas Lenggenhager4.4888
45E12469C1Ruediger Weis4.4893
4639F37F5DLutz Donnerhackeprivacy advocate & security expert4.4946
47F086CBB5Marcel Waldvogel4.4970
48961F4A35Tatu YlonenInventor of SSH4.5010
49F82CEA91Simon Cooper4.5065
50103D4013Theodore Ts'oext2fstools, Kerberos, LSB, other4.5085

In the Drew self plug, my own key moved from #272 to #80 with an MSD of 4.6027. This was probably mostly due to a good-sized keysigning at Ottawa Linux Symposium.

For next month

I would still like to see the text key IDs in some of the raw reports, to avoid having to look them up later, but this requires some rewriting in all the sections of code, to hold those text fields in RAM through from import to report. Maybe for September... I certainly wouldn't object to someone contributing this part.

Discussion about this analysis continues on the keyanalyze-discuss mailing list.

If you have any suggestions, please send them my way, especially if you have the algorithms as well. If you're so inclined, please have a look at the code as well.

 

All original content on this site is copyright (c)2000-2113 M. Drew Streib and licensed under the OpenContent License unless otherwise noted.