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Key Analysis begun 12 Jun 2001

The following stats are being pulled from a keyring that was provided by the.earth.li (thanks to Jonathan McDowell), which is complete as of June 11, 2001. This server's ring was the basis for my own initial import. Before reading this, please be sure to view the explanation of this analysis and read the FAQ before asking me any questions about it.

The strong set raw analysis is available here (~160KB). Please read the FAQ to explain how to read this file. This file includes all keys in the strong set.

General statistics
Size of binary keyring (bytes): 1,706,315,227
Number of keys: 1,461,786
Keys with at least one outside sig: 161,298
Number of those keys that have not been revoked: 151,751
Total outside sigs on those keys (not including self): 308,882

The "strong set"
Size of largest strongly connected set: 10,828
Keys that have signed this set: 15,133
Keys that this set has signed: 46,478

Best connected keys (shortest distance to)

Please read about the mean shortest distance (MSD) calculated here in the analysis explanation. Here are the top 50 keys. Look for your own key in this month's raw analysis (see above). Note that the only keys analyzed were those in the strong set. I've included some of my own comments on people I recognize. I'm sorry if you're listed here without a comment. If you email me a quick phrase to describe what you do that would be of interest to readers, I'll put it in.

The average MSD is 6.6741, in the set of 10,828. The median value is 6.4912.

Go to this keyserver's web interface to look up these keys.
RankHex ID (last 32b) Key Name (Identifier)Comments MSD
109590CFDPeter N. WanGA Tech college of computing4.1056
2F1A37611Theodore Y. Ts'o [ENCRYPTION]ext2fstools, Kerberos, much other4.1580
3466B4289Theodore Ts'o [SIGNATURE]ext2fstools, Kerberos, much other4.1709
44F570BA3Ingmar CamphausenPGP security maverick4.2124
58B4608A1Peter N. Wan PNW2048GA Tech college of computing4.2554
6C2009841Niels ProvosOpenBSD, OpenSSH, IPSEC4.2614
70A2F87E5Niels Provos (#2)OpenBSD, OpenSSH, IPSEC4.2615
8F081195DMatthias Bauer4.2661
9C7A966DDPhilip R. ZimmermannInventor of PGP4.2851
100DBF906DJeffrey I. SchillerMIT Security/Network Manager4.2889
11C1B06AF1Derek AtkinsPGP FAQ author, AFS Linux port, more4.2905
127DFF8533peter honeyman4.3487
130679ED91teun.nijssen@kub.nlManages SURFnet servers, scanned PGP source code4.3552
14DA0EDC81Phil Karn4.3780
151CF27FD5Marc HorowitzAuthor of pks PGP keyserver software4.3915
1608C95A15SURFnet-Master-Certification-Key4.4209
178531327FMartin Spill4.4221
1846F3212DLaMont Jones4.4386
1909D3E64DGreg RoseUSENIX, PGPMoose4.4460
207362BE39Carl Ellison4.4555
2113D9873DMirko Dziadzka4.4561
222DE30EC1CERT Coordination Center4.4583
23F95C2F6DChristoph MartinDebian maintainer & uni-mainz keyserver admin4.4609
24F82CEA91Simon CooperAuthor of "Building Internet Firewalls"4.4623
2566A74B31Teun NijssenManages SURFnet servers, scanned PGP source code4.4735
26603F2D01Stefan Kelm, DFN-PCA4.4745
278B05342DGraham King4.4752
284413B691Thomas Lenggenhager4.4837
29AE8F7CF5Martin Schulzejoey of the Debian Project4.4855
30C3FC4C69Steven M. Bellovin4.4889
312AAA9781Wolfgang Ley4.5082
322B48F6F5Ian GoldbergCypherpunks, Zero Knowledge4.5085
3339F37F5DLutz Donnerhacke4.5142
3401717265Ilja Hallberg4.5211
35961F4A35Tatu Ylonen4.5254
36DD934139Patrick Feisthammel4.5411
37FC0C02D5Eugene H. Spafford4.5474
38FAEBD5FCPhilip R. ZimmermannInventor of PGP4.5480
3952D1CAB1Nathalie Weiler4.5501
40CAAED99DAxel Grossklaus4.5532
41F414952BJeffrey I. Schiller4.5651
42955EC2C1Phil KarnIETF IP Security Working Group4.5657
431FE961A1Harald Koenigxfree864.5667
44E12469C1Ruediger Weis4.5674
455B0358A2Werner KochAuthor of GNU Privacy Guard4.5710
464DBA1091Gregory G. RoseUSENIX, PGPMoose4.5728
47DC4ED62DIngmar Camphausen, DFN-PCA (key expired)4.5762
484D92D1B1Rodney Thayer4.5770
49BB1D9F6Dct magazine CERTIFICATE4.5792
506916C873Peter N. Wan PNWGTDH40964.5801

In my own self plug, my own key sits at #1555 with an MSD of 5.4901. I'm just back from a key signing party though, so we'll see how it moves next month.

For next month

It seems easy enough to expand this analysis to keys that are reachable from the strong set as well, which would have been about 46,000 this month. The distance will simply be distance from the strong set, as the extra 35,000 keys will not be usable as a "from" address (as they cannot reach the strong set, else they would be in it).

I may also break out hop counts to each key, and also look for longest paths, etc, as that should be pretty easy.

If you have any suggestions, please send them my way, especially if you have the algorithms as well. I also haven't spent a great deal of time in optimization of my own code. If you're so inclined, please have a look and make this whole thing spend less CPU cycles (especially in the MSD calculations).

 

All original content on this site is copyright (c)2000-2113 M. Drew Streib and licensed under the OpenContent License unless otherwise noted.